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U.S. Tobacco Exports: The Dichotomy
Between Trade and Health Policies
Andrea J. Hageman
INTRODUCTION
An examination of the United States' policy regarding to-
bacco products reveals a striking inconsistency. While one gov-
ernment sector aggressively employs U.S. trade laws to open
foreign markets to U.S. tobacco products, another group actively
campaigns against smoking, both domestically and internation-
ally. Domestic tobacco consumption has fallen,' and the U.S. to-
bacco industry has tried to compensate for the diminishing
domestic market by increasing sales abroad.2 The industry has
enlisted the assistance of U.S. trade officials, who use section 301
of the Trade Act of 19743 effectively to open foreign markets to
U.S. tobacco products. Section 301 authorizes the U.S. govern-
ment to take unilateral action in response to a foreign govern-
ment's unreasonable restrictions on trade which burden U.S.
commerce. 4 Its retaliatory threat has been a powerful tool in
opening markets for U.S. tobacco exporters.
The conflicting goals of promoting tobacco exports and dis-
couraging smoking have created a dichotomy in U.S. policy5
1. U.S. consumption of tobacco products decreased from 9.7 pounds per
capita in 1970 to 5.8 pounds in 1989. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES, Table 1322, at 755
(1991). The proportion of U.S.-produced tobacco which Americans consume has
also declined from approximately 95% in the 1960s to an estimated 75% in 1991.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiC., TOBACCO SITUATION AND OuTLOK YEARBOOK 14, Table 1
(1991).
2. See generally Fred H. Jones, Comment, U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad Sec-
tion 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as a Tool for Achieving Access to Foreign Tobacco
Markets, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 439 (1989).
3. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
4. For a discussion of the types of foreign government practices that can
prompt section 301 action, see infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
5. [A] policy level conflict exists between U.S. trade goals and health
policy objectives regarding the export of tobacco products. On the one
hand, federal resources are used to facilitate the export of U.S. tobacco
and tobacco products, while on the other hand, the federal government
has directed a major domestic antismoking effort and is a participant in
the international antismoking movement.
MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
which the United States Congress is currently addressing. Con-
gress is considering legislation that would integrate health con-
cerns into tobacco export policy by including a representative
from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in
the interagency section 301 committee which evaluates actions
brought under section 301.6
This Note analyzes the dichotomy between the simultane-
ous efforts to promote tobacco exports and discourage smoking.
Part I is a description of these competing goals. Part II explains
the dichotomy between these two conflicting U.S. goals. Part III
analyzes the likely impact of the Cigarette Export Reform Act's
proposal to add an HHS representative to the section 301 com-
mittee and concludes that this is an appropriate means to ensure
that health concerns are integrated into tobacco export policy.
I. THE CONFLICTING GOALS OF U.S. TRADE AND
HEALTH POLICIES
A. PROMOTING EXPORTATION OF TOBACCO
Section 3017 is the main tool that the U.S. government em-
ploys to open foreign markets for U.S. tobacco exporters. It be-
came part of U.S. trade law in the Trade Act of 1974, and was
designed to promote U.S. exports8 by expanding the president's
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS: TRADE AND
HEALTH ISSUES: DICHOTOMY BETWEEN U.S. TOBACCO EXPORT POLICY AND ANT_
ISMOKING INITIATIVES 1 (1990) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6. Cigarette Export Reform Act, H.R. 2781, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
7. Section 301(a)(1), as amended, provides that:
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines under sec-
tion 304(a)(1) that -
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement
are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,
any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection
(c), subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding
any such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible action
within the power of the President that the President may direct the
Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such
rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
Trade Act of 1974 § 301(a)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)
(1988)).
8. Jones, supra note 2, at 447. "In order to... boost U.S. exports, section
301 was created to 'provide the President with negotiating leverage to insure
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authority to respond unilaterally to objectionable trade prac-
tices.9 The United States has invoked section 301 five times in
response to trade barriers to tobacco exports,10 and each time
the United States has successfully negotiated an agreement for
removal of those barriers, eliminating the need to retaliate." By
invoking section 301, the United States has effectively opened
foreign tobacco markets for U.S. exporters.12
1. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Congress has enhanced the law governing U.S. response to
objectionable trade practices 13 through a series of legislative ac-
tions. Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196214 required
fair and equitable conditions for United States commerce and to eliminate
[trade] barriers... and... distortion on a reciprocal basis."' Id. (quoting Patri-
cia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122, 1127 (1987) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 166, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7168, 7302)).
9. Jeanne S. Archibald, Section 301 and the Trade Act of 1974, in MANUAL
FOR THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAws, Part VII at VII-2 (William
K. Ince & Leslie A. Glick eds., 1984).
10. See ikfra note 12.
11. For a description of these agreements, see infra notes 73-96 and accom-
panying text.
12. U.S. cigarette exports to Asian countries, particularly Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea, and Thailand, have increased dramatically. FOREIGN AGRIC. SSER-
vICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, Jan. 15,1992 [herein-
after U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS]. The United States has invoked section 301
in response to barriers facing U.S. tobacco exports twice against Japan, and once
each against Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand. It was first used against Ja-
pan in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083-88 (1979). In that year, the U.S. exported ap-
proximately 3.7 million cigarettes to Japan. U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS,
supra. By 1991, U.S. exports of cigarettes to Japan had increased to an esti-
mated 62 million. Id. In 1986, the United States used section 301 against Tai-
wan. 51 Fed. Reg. 39,639 (1986). The United States exported approximately
209,000 cigarettes to Taiwan in that year, but this rose to 3 million by 1991. U.S.
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, supra. Similarly, U.S. producers exported 312,000
units of cigarettes to South Korea in 1987, and nearly 4 million in 1991. Id.
Finally, U.S. cigarette exports to Thailand rose from zero in 1990, to an esti-
mated 550,000 in 1991. Id,
13. The U.S. Congress authorized the president to respond unilaterally to
offensive foreign trade activities in recognition of the helplessness of U.S. ex-
porters frustrated by closed foreign markets. The United States' existing statu-
tory tools, such as those authorizing antidumping and countervailing duties in
response to dumping and subsidies, did not permit the United States to respond
to other types of improper foreign trade practices. Archibald, supra note 9, at
VII-1. Similarly, GATT's dispute resolution system had been ineffective in
eliminating barriers to U.S. exports. Jones, supra note 2, at 447.
14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 252(c), Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat.
872, 879 (1962) repealed by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978,
2041 (1975).
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the president to respond to foreign import restrictions that vio-
lated tariff commitments' 5 or trade agreements. 16 Section 252
also gave the president discretionary authority to respond to im-
port restrictions, other than those proscribed by trade agree-
ments, which directly or indirectly substantially burdened U.S.
commerce.' 7 If the president determined that use of his discre-
tionary authority was warranted, he could deny trade conces-
sions previously granted to the offending country,' 8 or refrain
from implementing any existing trade agreements with that
country.19  A history of legislative amendments which
strengthen this section of U.S. trade law illustrates Congress's
special concern with eliminating foreign trade barriers.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 superseded section
252(c). Section 301 represented the first major enhancement of
the U.S. government's ability to take unilateral action to re-
spond to foreign governments' discriminatory, unjustifiable, or
unreasonable acts or policies which burden or restrict U.S. com-
merce.20 As a result of the Trade Act of 1974, the president's
arsenal of retaliatory measures is no longer limited to denying
trade concessions and refusing to implement trade agreements.
Section 301 gave the president authority to impose duties or
other import restrictions on the products and trade-related serv-
ices2 ' of the offending country.2 Furthermore, section 301 au-
15. Id. § 252(a).
16. Id. § 252(b).
17. Id. § 252(c).
18. Id. § 252(c)(1).
19. Id. § 252(c)(2).
20. Discriminatory acts, policies, and practices include denial of national
treatment or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for U.S. goods, services, or in-
vestment. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5) (1988). An act, policy, or practice is unjustifi-
able if it violates the international legal rights of the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(d)(4)(A). Unjustifiable acts include those which deny U.S. products na-
tional or MFN treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5). Unreasonable acts, policies,
and practices are those which do not necessarily violate the international legal
rights of the U.S., but are otherwise inequitable. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A).
It is difficult to assess which acts, policies, or practices fall into the category
of "unreasonable" trade restrictions. Several commentators have criticized this
category of actionable trade restrictions for its vagueness, and have offered
more concrete definitions. See, e.g., David M. Pedley, Comment, A Definition
for " Unreasonable" in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Consideration of.
the United States-Thailand Tobacco Dispute, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 285 (1991).
For a discussion of possible interpretations of "unreasonable" immediately fol-
lowing passage of Section 301, see Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Un-
reasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 521 (1975).
21. Section 301 broadened the definition of "commerce" to include services
[Vol. 1:175
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thorized private parties to petition under section 301,23 thereby
enlarging the class of complainants eligible to bring such actions.
Amendments to section 301 in 1979 broadened the scope of
retaliation available to the president.24 The president was no
longer limited to retaliating against the offending country; he
could also retaliate in a nondiscriminatory manner.25 In addi-
tion, the 1979 amendments granted the president authority to
respond to trade restrictions against any service, even those that
were not trade-related. 26
At the same time that Congress increased the president's
discretion and authority, it imposed time limits for the initiation
associated with international trade. Trade Act of 1974 § 301(a)(4) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(1)(A) (1988)).
22. The president "may impose duties or other import restrictions on the
products of such foreign country or instrumentality, and may impose fees or
restrictions on the services of such foreign country or instrumentality, for such
time as he deems appropriate." Id § 301(a)(4)(B) (repealed 1979).
23. Any interested party may file a complaint with the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), who must review the petition to determine whether it
warrants an investigation. Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d)(2) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1)-(2) (1988)). "Interested persons" includes "domestic
firms and workers, representatives of consumer interests, United States prod-
uct exporters, and any industrial user of any goods or services that may be af-
fected by [section 301] actions." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(9) (1988).
24. Section 301, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
provided:
(a) DETERMINATIONS REQUIRING ACTiON.-If the President determines
that action by the United States is appropriate-
(1) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement; or
(2) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality that-
(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise de-
nies any benefits to the United States under, any trade
agreement, or
(B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his
power to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act,
policy, or practice. Action under this section may be taken on a nondis-
criminatory basis or solely against the products or services of the for-
eign country or instrumentality involved.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 295 (1979) (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
25. Id
26. As amended, section 301(d) provided: "For purposes of this section, the
term "commerce" includes, but is not limited to, services associated with inter-
national trade, whether or not such services are related to specific products."
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 901 (rewriting § 301(d)(1) of the Trade Act of
1974). This change made clear that services such as insurance, broadcasting,
and banking are included in the scope of section 301. Archibald, supra note 9, at
VII-3.
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and conclusion of investigations by the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) and for presidential action in response to
the USTR's investigations.27 These time limits assure prompt
action on section 301 complaints by preventing the USTR from
deferring action.
Congress made technical changes in section 301 in 1984,28
but the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 embod-
ied the most substantial amendments to section 301.- 9 Most sig-
nificantly, these amendments transferred the authority to act
under section 301 to the USTR, and created a category of situa-
tions in which the USTR is required to act.s° Section 301 now
requires retaliation when the USTR determines that a foreign
government is denying the United States' trade agreement bene-
fits31 and when a foreign government's act, policy, or practice is
unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. 32 Several
27. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901 (rewriting §§ 301-02 of the Trade
Act of 1974).
28. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948,
3002 (1984).
29. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1301, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). As of July
1992, the 1988 Act represents the most current rewriting of section 301 and is
identical to the version at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988). Sections 301(a) and (b) authorize the USTR
to determine whether action is warranted under both the mandatory and dis-
cretionary response provisions. The purpose of this shift in authority was to
ensure that trade considerations alone controlled in section 301 decisions,
thereby avoiding the possibility that trade benefits would be exchanged for for-
eign policy, defense, or other nontrade considerations. Fusae Nara, Note, A
Shft Toward Protectionism Under § 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Problems of
Unilateral Trade Retaliation Under International Law, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
229, 242 (1990) (summarizing the debate regarding transfer of authority de-
scribed in Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act A
Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8
(1988) [hereinafter Heart of the 1988 Trade Act], also published in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYS-
TEm 49, (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRES-
SIVE UNILATERALISM]).
The extent to which the shift in authority achieves this goal is questionable,
however, because the USTR "still serves at the pleasure of the president, and
therefore is unlikely to take actions of which the president disapproves." Heart
of the 1988 Trade Act, supra, at 57. See also Archibald, supra note 9, at VII-7
(suggesting that foreign policy issues and other considerations unrelated to
trade may be raised during the interagency review process and affect the out-
come of the inquiry).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B).
In addition to this new mandatory response provision, the 1988 amend-
ments made two other changes to section 301 that greatly enhanced the United
States' ability to open foreign trade markets to its exports. The first change,
[Vol. 1:175
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situations remain, however, in which section 301 does not man-
date retaliation.33
Currently, the president,s4 private parties,s 5 and the USTR
can initiate section 301 actions.36 Private parties must indicate
the product, service, or intellectual property right which the of-
fensive practice affects,3 7 describe what rights of the United
States are being violated or denied, and identify the foreign
country engaging in the offensive practice.3s After the party
files a petition with the USTR, the USTR has forty-five days to
decide whether to initiate an investigation under section 302.39
If the USTR determines that the section 301 complaint is action-
able, an investigation begins.40
While considering whether to investigate or recommend
that the president retaliate, the USTR consults with the inter-
agency section 301 committee.41 This committee is chaired by a
representative of the USTR and consists of officials from other
agencies concerned with the particular issue raised by a section
Super 301, requires the USTR to identify "priority practices" which create bar-
riers for U.S. exports and "priority foreign countries" which employ such prac-
tices. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a). Super 301 also establishes strict time limits for USTR
investigations of priority practices, 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b), and for negotiation of
agreements to eliminate the practices. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c). The second change,
Special 301, extends similar trade protection to intellectual property rights. 19
U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A-B).
Super 301 and Special 301 are powerful weapons for the United States in its
battle against foreign trade barriers, and have been the object of considerable
criticism because they give the United States extraordinary authority to take
unilateral action. See, e.g., Hugh T. Patrick, Commentary on Super 301 and
Japan, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 30, at 242.
33. These situations include cases in which a GATT panel has ruled against
the United States, the USTR is satisfied with the other nation's response to the
U.S. complaint, or U.S. action would do more harm than good to the U.S. econ-
omy or national security. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (1988).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
37. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1(a)(1-5) (1988).
38. Section 301 actions are limited to responding to the acts of a foreign
country. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a). It therefore provides no remedy for the unfair
trade practices of private foreign actors. See Jones, supra note 2, at 455. 'Thus,
private actions by foreigners such as collusion or predatory pricing are not ac-
tionable under section 301." Id.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1988). Section 302 is the investigatory provision
accompanying section 301 and is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2412.
40. Id
41. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.3 (1977). "The committee considers such issues as
whether to initiate dispute settlement, what legal arguments to make, whether
to negotiate a solution and, if so, on what basis, and whether to recommend
retaliation to the President." Archibald, supra note 9, at VII-7.
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301 complaint.4 Typically, representatives from the Depart-
ments of State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture and Labor at-
tend section 301 committee meetings.4 3 The 301 committee
reviews complaints received under section 301 and assists the
USTR in deciding whether a complaint is actionable and war-
rants an investigation." If the USTR initiates an investigation,
the 301 committee holds public hearings about the complaints.4
When the USTR, upon recommendation of the 301 commit-
tee, determines that a foreign trade practice is actionable, the
USTR must also request bilateral consultations with the offend-
ing government.4 These negotiations may lead to a successful
resolution of the problem. In addition, the United States may
refer the matter to GATT for consideration, and GATT panel
consideration of the issue may facilitate an acceptable agree-
ment between the U.S. and the offending country.4 7 If the 301
committee approves a bilateral agreement for removal of trade
barriers reached during the section 302 investigation,4 that
agreement may cause the USTR to terminate the section 301
investigation.49
If these attempts to negotiate an acceptable agreement fail,
the interagency committee may recommend that the USTR take
further action.5° The United States may then retaliate under
42. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.3. The USTR invites agencies to join the 301 commit-
tee and, in practice, the same agencies participate in all section 301 cases,
although they may be represented by different officials. Archibald, supra note
9, at VII-7.
The section 301 committee is a staff level committee, 15 C.F.R.
§ 2002.3(a)(3), and may refer matters to higher level committees such as the
Trade Policy Staff Committee. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.2 (1977). "If the [section 301]
committee is unable to reach a consensus on any given issue, the question must
be referred to a higher level interagency committee for resolution. Occasion-
ally, differences must be resolved at the Cabinet level." Archibald, supra note
9, at VII-7.
43. Archibald, supra note 9, at VII-7.
44. Id. at VII-6.
45. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.3(b)(2). The 301 committee's public hearings are not
the only opportunities for public comment on section 301 actions. Upon decid-
ing to initiate an investigation, the USTR publishes a notice and request for
public comment in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1).
47. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 1388 (1981) (announcing that the United States's
section 301 investigation of Japan's tobacco trade policies was terminated while
a GATT panel was considering the matter).
48. The USTR consults with the 301 committee to decide whether to nego-
tiate a solution with the offending country, and if so, on what basis to make
such an agreement. Archibald, supra note 9, at VII-7.
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2417.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3).
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section 301.51 Because the threat of retaliation is usually suffi-
cient to compel the foreign government to remove its trade bar-
riers,52 especially in those cases in which U.S. law mandates
retaliation,53 the United States rarely retaliates under section
301.54
The USTR has broad discretion in determining its means of
section 301 retaliation. Section 301 authorizes the USTR to re-
taliate by suspending or withdrawing trade agreement benefits,
or by imposing duties or restrictions on goods and services from
the offending country.s5 Moreover, the USTR may retaliate by
discriminating against an offending country's goods and services
"without regard to whether or not such goods... were involved
in the act, policy, or practice" involved in the section 301 ac-
tion.se Such retaliation, however, does not compensate the pri-
vate petitioner allegedly damaged by the offensive trade
practices. 57 Instead, the value of section 301 to the private peti-
tioner stems from its threat of retaliation, which induces the for-
51. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). If the foreign trade measure at issue is one for
which section 301 requires mandatory action, the USTR has no discretion and
must retaliate. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
52. Section 301's threat of retaliation has been called "the economic
equivalent of John Foster Dulles' nuclear brinkmanship-a tactic of massive
retaliation that taunts trading partners to call America's bluff. The prospect of
punitive sanctions is usually enough to wring concessions from the other side."
Peter Schmeisser, Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1988, § 6
(Magazine) at 16, 18 [hereinafter Pushing Cigarettes Overseas].
53. See supra notes 3033 and accompanying text.
54. For a summary of U.S. retaliation resulting from section 301 actions,
see Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, Annex
2, in IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 9, 37 (Michael Hart & Debra Steger eds., 1992). Hudec summa-
rizes nine instances prior to 1990 where the United States retaliated and notes
that, in some of those cases, the United States' legal authority to retaliate
stemmed from provisions other than section 301. Id at 4.
55. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(11).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3)(B).
57. Although private petitioners do not recover any damages as a result of
section 301 retaliation, U.S. action under this provision provides substantial ben-
efits to them. Indeed, it is a remedy clearly intended to help U.S. exporters and
is an effective tool for expanding markets for U.S. industries by breaking down
barriers to U.S. exports. Jones, supra note 2, at 453. Section 301 may in fact
provide a more powerful remedy than antidumping and countervailing duty
laws, if commentators who claim that section 301 is not subject to judicial re-
view are correct. Id. (quoting Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301
Recent Developments and Proposed Amendments, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 68
(1988) [hereinafter Section 301 Recent Developments]). For a discussion of po-
tential review of section 301 fairness determinations, see Erwin P. Eichmann &
Gary Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of
Section 301?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989).
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eign government to eliminate its objectionable trading
practice.m
2. Use of Section 301 to Promote Tobacco Exports
The threat of section 301 retaliation has been effective in
eliminating barriers to the export of U.S. tobacco products. The
United States has invoked section 301 to promote tobacco ex-
ports to Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, and twice to pro-
mote tobacco exports to Japan. In each instance, the United
States persuaded the country concerned to eliminate the ques-
tionable trade practices, thus paving the way for increased to-
bacco exports to these newly-opened markets.5 9 The resulting
increases in tobacco exports have helped U.S. tobacco companies
to offset the decline in domestic tobacco consumption.6°
The United States first used section 301 to promote tobacco
exports in 1979. Two tobacco trade associations filed petitions
with the USTR alleging that Japan was employing restrictive
trade practices. The Cigar Association of America (CAA) filed
the first petition on March 14, 1979.61 The CAA's complaint al-
leged that Japan's tobacco monopoly62 employed unreasonable
import restrictions and trade practices which burdened U.S.
commerce in cigars.63 Specifically, the CAA accused Japan's to-
bacco monopoly of setting unreasonably high retail prices for ci-
gars.6 Furthermore, the CAA complained of Japan's excessive
restrictions on cigar advertising.65 If Japan were to eliminate
these restrictions, the CAA alleged, U.S. producers would sell
58. See Jones, supra note 2, at 454 (arguing that "the threatened use of sec-
tion 301 to block access to U.S. markets is much more effective than actual re-
taliation") (emphasis in original) (citing Section 301 Recent Developments,
supra note 57, at 70).
59. See supra note 12 for a description of how tobacco exports to Asian
countries have increased since the United States first invoked section 301.
60. See supra note 1 for a description of the decline in U.S. domestic to-
bacco consumption.
61. 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083-88 (1979).
62. The term "foreign country" in section 301 includes foreign instrumen-
talities, such as Japan's tobacco monopoly. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4)(B)(7) (1988).
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 19,084. The CAA complained of the following restrictions on ci-
gar advertising and marketing: (1) an unreasonably long test market period for
new products; (2) a ban on all press releases announcing the introductions of
new cigars, except those of the Japanese tobacco monopoly; (3) advertising per-
mitted only to announce a price change; and (4) a regulation limiting access to
information about imported cigars by permitting publication of such informa-
tion only in the monopoly's catalog. Id.
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many more cigars in Japan.66
The Associated Tobacco Manufacturers (ATM) filed the
second petition on October 22, 1979,67 alleging that Japan's to-
bacco monopoly maintained restrictions on imported pipe to-
bacco similar to those on cigars.68 The ATM criticized the
Japanese tobacco monopoly for tightly restricting advertising of
U.S. pipe tobacco, while merely "exercising restraint" in the ad-
vertising of Japanese tobacco. 69
Because these two complaints were similar, the USTR con-
solidated them into one investigation.70 At the United States'
request, a GATT panel was formed to consider the matter.71 Bi-
lateral discussions led to an agreement before the GATT panel
completed its examination of the dispute, and the U.S. termi-
nated its section 301 investigation on January 6, 1981.72 The
agreement reduced tariffs and liberalized the other Japanese re-
strictions on importation and distribution of imported cigars and
pipe tobacco.7 3
In 1985, the United States again invoked section 301 in re-
sponse to Japan's trade restrictions on tobacco. On September
16, the USTR initiated an investigation into Japan's allegedly re-
strictive policies regarding various tobacco products.74 The com-
plaint asserted that, while Japan had taken steps to liberalize
restrictive trade policies, it continued to impose high tariffs, pro-
hibit foreign firms from manufacturing tobacco products in Ja-
pan,7 5 and restrict distribution of U.S. tobacco products.76
66. Id.
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 64,938-40 (1979).
68. Id. See supra note 65 for a description of the alleged restrictions on
advertising and marketing of cigars.
69. 44 Fed. Reg. 64,939. The ATM asserted that this disparate treatment
resulted in imported U.S. pipe tobacco brands receiving very limited public ex-
posure. Id.
Japanese restraint regarding advertising was effective, even though not re-
quired by law. See, e.g., Peter Schmeisser, When Health and Trade Policies
Clash, NAT'L J., Apr. 16, 1988, at 1016, 1017 [hereinafter When Health and Trade
Policies Clash]. Japanese producers observed an informal agreement with gov-
ernment health authorities regarding advertising. Id. Under that agreement,
Japan's cigarette manufacturers agreed not to advertise cigarettes during televi-
sion movies, sports broadcasts, and music video shows that were popular among
women and teenagers. Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, supra note 52, at 18-19.
70. 46 Fed. Reg. 1388-89 (1981).
71. Id. at 1389.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985).
75. The tobacco industry complained that there was no way for foreigners
to circumvent tariff and non-tariff barriers employed by the Japanese tobacco
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Negotiations produced an agreement that Japan would remove
the barriers and on October 6, 1986, President Reagan directed
the USTR to suspend its investigation.77
The United States next invoked section 301 against Taiwan.
In October of 1985, Taiwan had agreed to provide greater access
to its tobacco market, but a year later President Reagan deter-
mined that Taiwan had not met its obligations under that agree-
ment.78 As a result, the president announced on October 30,
1986, that he planned to implement proportional countermea-
sures until Taiwan removed its restrictions. 79 Taiwan quickly
eliminated its restrictive policies, and the United States termi-
nated its section 301 proceeding on December 5, 1 9 8 6 .s In the
agreement, Taiwan gave the United States the right to conduct a
wide range of promotional and advertising activities for tobacco
monopoly because Japan barred manufacturing investment there by non-Japa-
nese. Ukfair Trade Practices: U.S. Settles Tobacco Dispute with Japan, No
Deal Reached with Brazil on Irkformatics, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1215 (Oct. 8,
1986) [hereinafter U.S. Settles Tobacco Dispute with Japan].
Japan's prohibition against investment by foreign tobacco firms may have
been targeted in this dispute because U.S. tobacco firms consider such invest-
ment to be an essential step in their attempts to gain a strong foothold in Asian
tobacco markets. Investment in foreign firms was a factor in successfully ex-
panding tobacco markets in Latin America in the 1960s. See %'hen Health and
Trade Policies Clash, supra note 69, at 1016.
[The U.S. tobacco industry] "conquered the Latin market in three
steps." After first breaking down the barriers that restricted the sale
of foreign brands, U.S. firms saturated Latin consumers with advertis-
ing. Finally .... after carving out a niche in the market, the U.S. com-
panies "began to buy out and take over most of the national cigarette
firms in Latin America."
Id. (quoting Philip L. Shepherd of Florida International University).
76. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985).
77. 51 Fed. Reg. 35,995-96 (1986). In his memorandum to the USTR, Presi-
dent Reagan specifically noted that the agreement negotiated "should accom-
plish our goal of obtaining increased access for U.S. firms to Japan's cigarette
market." Id at 35,996.
Under the agreement, Japan suspended its tariff on foreign tobacco prod-
ucts, reduced the approval time for cigarette price changes, and removed delays
and other impediments to distribution of foreign tobacco products. U.S. Settles
Tobacco Dispute with Japan, supra note 75, at 1215.
78. Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, Oct. 27,
1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,639 (1986). The 1985 agreement with Taiwan involved beer
and wine, as well as tobacco products. Under that arrangement, Taiwan agreed
to: (1) lift its import ban on beer; (2) allow the sale of U.S. products at all retail
outlets where Taiwanese products were sold; (3) refrain from marking up retail
prices of imported products at a rate higher than domestic products; and (4)
allow market forces to determine how much of these products it would import.
Id.
79. Id.
80. 51 Fed. Reg. 44,958 (1986).
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products and guaranteed U.S. producers direct access to all of
Taiwan's retail outlets.81
The next country against which the U.S. invoked section 301
regarding tobacco trade policies was South Korea. On January
22, 1988, the Cigarette Exporters Association (CEA) filed a sec-
tion 301 complaint against South Korea, alleging that the Ko-
rean tobacco monopoly maintained practices that restricted the
export of U.S. cigarettes to Korea.8 2 The CEA claimed that a
high tariff and discriminatory retail pricing caused imported cig-
arettes to be sold at unreasonably high prices.83 The CEA also
complained that the monopoly maintained restrictions on the
distribution and brand mix of imported cigarettes, and prohib-
ited non-Korean firms from investing in the Korean tobacco in-
dustry s4 The USTR initiated an investigation on February 16,
1988.85 Again, the section 301 action induced a quick agreement
which provided foreign producers nondiscriminatory access to
South Korea's tobacco market.s6 The agreement permitted for-
eign cigarette firms to advertise in South Korean magazines and
to conduct sales promotions, such as sponsored events.8 7 Ac-
cordingly, the United States terminated its section 301 action on
May 31, 1988."
Most recently, the United States initiated a 301 action to ad-
dress Thailand's restrictions on tobacco trade. On April 10, 1989,
the CEA filed a petition with the USTR, complaining that the
Thai Tobacco Monopoly effectively banned imports.8 9 The peti-
tion further stated that this ban--combined with Thailand's
high tariffs, discriminatory internal taxes, and distribution re-
81. Unfair Trade Practices: U.S. Scraps Retaliation Plans After Taiwan
Agrees to Import US. Beer, Wine, Cigarettes, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1484
(Dec. 10, 1986).
82. 53 Fed. Reg. 4926-27 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id,
85. Id.
86. 53 Fed. Reg. 20,406 (1988).
87. Unfair Trade Practices: US., South Korea Settle Section 301 Case
Against Import Barriers to US. Cigarettes, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May
11, 1988). Advertising and promotions by foreign cigarette firms were previ-
ously banned in South Korea. Id.
88. 53 Fed. Reg. 20,406.
89. 54 Fed Reg. 23,724-25 (1989). Thailand allowed only licensed entities to
import cigarettes. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD 37th Supp. 200, T 6 (1991) (GATT panel report
adopted Nov. 7, 1990), reprinted in 30 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1122 (1991) (hereinafter
Panel Report on Thai Restrictions]. Licenses had been granted solely to the
Thai Tobacco Monopoly, which imported cigarettes on only three occasions. Id.
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strictions-denied U.S. firms fair access to Thai cigarette mar-
kets.90 The USTR initiated an investigation into Thailand's
practices on May 25, 1989.91
After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate an acceptable solu-
tion, the United States requested a GATT panel determina-
tion.92  The panel concluded that Thailand's quantitative
restrictions on imported cigarettes were inconsistent with its ob-
ligations under the GATT.93 After the panel's determination,
Thailand eliminated its ban on imported cigarettes and agreed to
grant imported tobacco products national, nondiscriminatory
treatment.94 In response, the United States terminated its sec-
tion 301 procedure on November 23, 1990.95 Although Thailand
opened its market to imports, it then imposed a stiff ban on ciga-
rette advertising.96
The section 301 actions against these Asian countries illus-
trate that the United States has consistently used its trade laws
to help U.S. tobacco producers increase their exports. At the
same time, the United States has discouraged the use of these
same products at home and abroad.
B. ANTISMOKING EFFORTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) be-
gan addressing the health risks associated with smoking in the
1960s and has since attempted to inhibit tobacco promotion and
decrease domestic tobacco consumption. Similarly, the U.S. gov-
ernment participates in antismoking campaigns designed to dis-
courage tobacco use worldwide.
Over the past thirty years, the United States has imple-
90. 54 Fed. Reg. 23,724-25 (1989).
91. Id.
92. The United States requested consultations with Thailand under GATT
Article XXIII:I on December 22, 1989. Panel Report on Thai Restrictions,
supra note 89, 1 1.
93. Id. 87. In contrast, the panel found that Thailand's internal taxes did
not violate its GAIT obligations. Id.
94. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,724-25 (1990). 'The decision was seen as a victory for
U.S. cigarette producers trying to penetrate one of the last major Asian markets
still closed to them." Thailand Gives in to U.S. Pressure to Open Market, Reu-
ter Bus. Rep., Oct. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
95. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,724.
96. Pete Engardio, Asi. A New Front in the War on Smoking, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 25, 1991, at 66. See also Morton Mintz, Tobacco Roads: Delivering Death to
the Third World, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 24, 1991, at 24, 27 (describing the
United States' success in the GATT complaint as a Pyrrhic victory because the
Thai government responded by imposing high import duties, cumbersome cus-
toms clearance procedures, and a stiff ban on cigarette advertising).
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mented specific measures to discourage domestic tobacco use. In
1964, the Surgeon General released an influential report warn-
ing of the health risks associated with cigarette smoking.97
Since then, Congress has enacted various legislation intended to
discourage tobacco use. One year after the Surgeon General's
report, Congress required all cigarette packages sold domesti-
cally to display conspicuously a warning disclosing health risks
associated with smoking.98 Significantly, this 1965 Act and its
successors have not applied to exports. 99 In 1984, Congress ex-
panded the 1965 Act to require that health warnings appear on
cigarette advertisements;100 Congress had already banned all cig-
arette advertisements from television and radio, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1971.101
In addition to restricting domestic cigarette promotion, the
U.S. government has enacted other legislation designed to de-
crease domestic tobacco consumption. For example, in 1988, the
Federal Aviation Administration announced a ban on smoking
on all domestic airline flights less than two hours in duration.10 2
This ban has since been expanded to prohibit smoking on virtu-
97. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF
THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964). The report concluded that cigarette smok-
ing is a factor in cancer of the mouth, lungs, esophagus and urinary bladder.
SUMMARY OF THE SURGEON GENERAL's ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON SMOKING AND
HEALTH (1964), quoted in Jones, supra note 2, at 441 n.15. The report also an-
nounced that smoking contributes to chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphy-
sema, bronchopulmonary disease, cardiovascular disease, and low infant birth
weight in babies whose mothers smoke. Id.
98. The 1965 Act required the following warning to be placed clearly and
conspicuously on all cigarette packages: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined that Cigarette Smoking is Hazardous to Your Health." Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)). Congress has since
amended the labeling requirement, ordering that labels include one of the fol-
lowing stronger warnings: SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Preg-
nancy; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Risks to Your Health; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking
by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low
Birth Weight; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
99. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 4. This remains in
the law's current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988).
100. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat.
2200, 2201 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)).
101. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84
Stat. 87, 89 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)).
102. 52 Fed. Reg. 12,358 (1988).
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ally all domestic flights.'03 Moreover, Congress has required the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish and imple-
ment a comprehensive educational program to inform the public
about the health dangers of smoking cigarettes. 1° 4 Antismoking
efforts such as these have greatly contributed to the decline 0 5 in
U.S. tobacco consumption.1 6
The U.S. government has also taken steps to discourage
smoking worldwide. For example, the United States is an active
member of the World Health Organization (WHO), contributing
twenty-five percent of its budget. 0 7 Through its membership in
the WHO, the United States participates in a global program to
discourage tobacco use and increase awareness of the health per-
ils of smoking.'0 8 The WHO's Expert Committee on Smoking
Control Strategies in Developing Countries recommends tactics
which developing countries can employ to reduce smoking.1° 9
The WHO has also recently published a catalog of the antismok-
ing legislation adopted by various countries which will assist
governments wishing to curtail domestic tobacco use.110 Fur-
thermore, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), an organization sponsored by the U.S. government, en-
courages and facilitates U.S. investment in developing countries
by providing loans and political risk guarantee insurance."' In
recognition of the adverse health consequences of smoking,
112
OPIC has consistently denied U.S. tobacco companies' requests
for investment assistance.
1 1 3
The U.S. government discourages smoking domestically
through legislation, and internationally by sponsoring organiza-
tions whose agendas include deterring tobacco use. These antis-
moking activities conflict directly with the United States'
aggressive use of section 301 to open foreign markets for exports
of U.S. tobacco products.
103. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1991).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
105. See supra note 1 (describing the decline in U.S. tobacco consumption).
106. Jones, supra note 2, at 441.
107. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 36.
108. Id.
109. Panel Report on Thai Restrictions, supra note 89, 56.
110. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TOBACCO
USE (1991). This book is "a most valuable tool for exchange of information on
legislative strategies to control promotion and use of tobacco." Ruth Roemer,
Foreword to id., at ix. As Roemer points out, "[liegislation is one of the strong-
est weapons to combat the world smoking epidemic." Id.
111. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 36.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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II. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN U.S. POLICIES
PROMOTING TOBACCO EXPORTS AND
DISCOURAGING SMOKING
The inconsistency between U.S. tobacco export and antis-
moking programs has diminished both the U.S. government's
reputation and the effectiveness of both endeavors. For these
reasons, the dichotomy must be addressed. A variety of promi-
nent critics have attacked the U.S. government for actively pro-
moting tobacco exports. For example, C. Everett Koop, the
former Surgeon General, compared U.S. tobacco policy to the
export of cocaine to the United States by foreign countries and
declared that it is the "height of hypocrisy for the United States
to export tobacco. ' 11 4 The American Medical Association has
also derided U.S. trade policy, stating that it "perpetuates the
problem of smoking by trying to develop overseas a market that
is drying up at home.""15
Trade and health officials work at cross purposes,116 de-
creasing the effectiveness of both tobacco export promotion and
antismoking efforts. Increasing U.S. tobacco exports has a de-
structive effect on the U.S.-sponsored worldwide antismoking
campaign. Similarly, to the extent that these campaigns are suc-
cessful, they undermine U.S. export promotion by shrinking for-
eign tobacco markets.
The conflict between tobacco export and antismoking activi-
ties results from the independent formulation of trade and
health policies.117 U.S. trade officials develop trade policy with-
out considering health issues and absent HHS input. Likewise,
the United States pursues antismoking campaigns without re-
gard to their impact on U.S. tobacco exports."l 8 U.S. trade and
health officials have conflicting goals with respect to the promo-
tion of U.S. tobacco exports and, accordingly, develop divergent
policies.
U.S. trade officials view tobacco exports strictly as a matter
of international trade, and therefore believe health concerns are
114. Barbara Rudolph, Fuming over a Hazardous Export, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989,
at 82.
115. A.M.A. Assails Nation's Export Policy on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1990, at Al, A12.
116. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
117. Id. The lack of communication between the two policy formulating en-
tities is responsible for the resulting incoherence in U.S. policy. Trade Policy:
Bush Administration Export Policies at Odds with Public Health Goals, GAO
Report Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 726 (May 23, 1991).
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-37.
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irrelevant. 119 They claim that their efforts to expand tobacco
exports to Asia merely ensure that U.S. exporters are able to
sell tobacco products in existing Asian markets on the same
terms as their foreign domestic competitors. 120 Furthermore,
the USTR asserts that U.S. tobacco companies will accept will-
ingly any restrictions which foreign governments place on the
marketing of both imported and domestic tobacco products.121
As long as tobacco products are being sold in foreign markets,
these officials argue, there is no reason to exclude foreign
exports.122
The actions of U.S. trade officials and tobacco exporters,
however, do not reflect their stated intentions. U.S. tobacco ex-
porters are not content with gaining a portion of the existing
Asian tobacco markets and seem unwilling to accept foreign gov-
ernments' nondiscriminatory regulations on tobacco products.
Rather, U.S. companies seek the USTR's assistance to compel
foreign governments to change their laws governing cigarette
marketing. By conducting negotiations under section 301, the
USTR has helped U.S. tobacco companies secure the right to em-
ploy their sophisticated advertising and promotional techniques
to expand Asian tobacco markets.
The USTR's assistance to U.S. tobacco exporters in securing
advertising rights in Asian countries has been an important fac-
tor in increasing cigarette sales in these markets. U.S. tobacco
exporters have gained the right to advertise their products in
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Prior to the section 301 ac-
tions against Japan, Japanese tobacco producers censored their
own advertising.123 After the actions, the Japanese abandoned
their self-imposed advertising restraint and began cigarette ad-
vertising campaigns that rival those of U.S. producers. 12 4 Simi-
119. Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, supra note 52, at 18. "We are concerned
about trade policy, period.... [We are not telling people to smoke, we are
simply gaining access to an existing market." Id. (statement of Catherine R.
Field, USTR Assistant General Counsel).
120. Id. "All we wanted was a fair crack at their markets. Just the chance
to compete on equal footing with their domestic brands; nothing more, nothing
less." Id. (USTR negotiator's description of the Thailand tobacco dispute).
121. Id. at 22. "If they want to print strict warnings, prohibit sale to minors,
or possibly ban smoking altogether, then we'll be the first to fall in line." Id.
(statement of Peter F. Allgeier, Assistant United States Trade Representative).
122. A statement by the USTR to the Government Accounting Office epito-
mizes the attitude of trade officials: "As long as cigarettes remain a legal com-
modity in the United States and abroad, there is no legal basis to deny cigarette
manufacturers assistance in gaining market access." Mintz, supra note 96, at 24.
123. See supra note 69.
124. When Health and Trade Policies Clash, supra note 69, at 1017. Be-
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larly, South Korea and Taiwan had banned cigarette advertising
almost completely before the United States employed section
301 to open their cigarette markets.125 As a result of the agree-
ments the USTR negotiated during the respective section 301 ac-
tions, Taiwan and South Korea changed their advertising laws to
allow foreign producers to advertise their products.126
The ability to advertise their cigarettes in foreign markets
has enabled U.S. tobacco exporters to increase their sales by in-
creasing their market share and by expanding overall demand.
When U.S. tobacco producers enter a foreign market, they em-
ploy marketing techniques far more sophisticated than those of
the foreign country's domestic firms.127 Consequently, U.S. ex-
porters capture a share of the existing tobacco market. As do-
mestic firms develop advanced advertising techniques to rival
those of U.S. tobacco companies, the growing volume and effec-
tiveness of combined cigarette advertising attracts new smokers,
increasing overall demand for cigarettes. 12s U.S. tobacco compa-
nies allegedly have also sought to develop demand in newer
market segments by using advertising and promotional cam-
paigns to entice women and teenagers to begin smoking.129
tween 1986 and 1988, the number of advertisements for cigarettes on Japanese
television doubled. Id
125. Pushing Cigarettes Overseas, supra note 52, at 18.
126. I& at 20.
127. See Mike Levin, U.S. Tobacco Firms Push Eagerly into Asian Market,
MARKETING NEws, Jan. 25, 1991, at 2. Marketing industry experts identify so-
phisticated marketing techniques as the main reason for U.S. tobacco producers'
success in Asian markets. Id.
In Japan, for example, Japanese producers' lack of marketing expertise
was one reason that U.S. brands succeeded immediately upon entering the Jap-
anese market. Masayoshi Kanabayashi, In 'Tobacco Smoker's Paradise' of Ja-
pan, U.S. Cigarettes Are Epitome of High Style, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,1991, at
B1.
128. For example, cigarette sales in Japan reached record levels by rising
3.3% in the year ending March 31, 1991. Kanabayashi, supra note 127, at B1.
129. See, e.g., Michael Di Cicco, Asian Group Fights US. Tobacco Blitz, UPI,
Jan. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. U.S. tobacco
firms categorically denied allegations that they direct marketing efforts at wo-
men and children. I& There are, however, specific examples of U.S. marketing
directed at these groups, and smoking has increased among women and teenag-
ers. Id. For example, the Asia Pacific Association for the Control of Tobacco
(APACT) asserts that U.S. companies have redoubled their marketing efforts
directed at women, using advertising campaigns for brands such as Virginia
Slims, which are intended to appeal to women. Id APACT also criticized U.S.
promotions in which smokers could exchange empty cigarette packages for free
admission to concerts and discos as being specifically directed at teenagers. Id
R.J. Reynolds cancelled three such concerts amid a storm of protest. Levin,
supra note 127, at 14.
Japanese tobacco marketers have also begun to target women and teenag-
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Critics argue that helping companies market cigarettes
abroad under standards less stringent than those that apply in
the United States is hypocritical13° and sends a message "that
Asian lungs are more expendable than American ones."'1 3 1 Fur-
thermore, the United States' attempts to relax foreign countries'
laws restricting cigarette advertising conflict with its stated in-
tent to help nations that seek to adopt antismoking regula-
tions. 132  In fact, such attempts sabotage U.S.-sponsored
antismoking campaigns designed to help other countries develop
antismoking strategies.
The independent development of tobacco export and antis-
moking policies emerges from the conflicting goals of trade and
health officials. Trade policy officials enthusiastically promote
tobacco exports, without regard to the impact this has on U.S.
antismoking programs. Similarly, U.S. health officials ignore
the effect that antismoking programs have on promoting U.S.
tobacco exports. Communication among trade and health offi-
cials could reconcile this conflict in U.S. policy by integrating
health concerns into the formulation of tobacco export policy.
Such communication will foster a coherent U.S. tobacco policy
capable of addressing both trade and health interests.
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN U.S. TRADE
AND HEALTH POLICIES
A. THE CIGARETTE EXPORT REFORM ACT
Recent congressional initiatives suggest that Congress has
ers, introducing new brands such as "Dean" (named for James Dean) and
"Misty." When Health and Trade Policies Clash, supra note 69, at 1017.
130. See supra notes 115-16, and accompanying text.
131. When Health and Trade Policies Clash, supra note 69, at 1017 (quoting
Rep. Chester Atkins, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs). See, e.g., Trade Policy: Rep. Waxman Criticizes Sullivan's Decisions to
Block HHS Testimony on Tobacco E.'ports, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 725 (May
23, 1990). Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services Dr. James Mason
stated that it is unconscionable for cigarette producers to be "peddling their
poison abroad, particularly because their main targets are less-developed coun-
tries." James Mason, Address to the Seventh World Health Conference on
Smoking and Health (Apr. 5, 1990), quoted in Mintz, supra note 96, at 25. Ma-
son accused U.S. tobacco exporters of playing "our free-trade laws and export
policies like a Stradivarius violin, pressuring our trade-promotion agencies to
keep open - and even force open in some cases - other nations' markets for
their products." Id.
132. See, e.g., Irwin Arieff, Sullivan Denies U.S. Policy Conflict Over To-
bacco Exports, Reuters, May 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File. (HHS Secretary Sullivan offered U.S. assistance to nations that wish to
adopt nondiscriminatory antismoking measures.)
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recognized the necessity and feasibility of integrating health
concerns into tobacco export strategy. In contrast, the Adminis-
tration has ignored this dichotomy in U.S. policy, repeatedly sup-
pressing HHS efforts to inject health concerns into trade policy
formulation. 133
In 1990, the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO), at Congress's direction, undertook a comprehensive
study of trade and health considerations relevant to tobacco ex-
port policy formulation.134 The report concluded that "a policy
level conflict exists between U.S. trade goals and health policy
objectives in regard to the export of tobacco products."'13 The
GAO report outlined three possible courses of congressional ac-
tion. If Congress believes that trade considerations should be
foremost in the development of tobacco export policy, the GAO
stated, it should maintain the status quo by continuing to employ
section 301 to overcome barriers to tobacco exports while pro-
moting awareness of the health risks associated with using those
products. 136 Under this course of action, U.S. trade policy would
continue to develop without consideration of the health conse-
quences of tobacco use, and without HHS's involvement in the
133. For example, in February 1987, HHS announced a meeting of the Inter-
agency Committee on Smoking and Health. The scheduled topic was "Interna-
tional Health Implications of U.S. Tobacco Trade Policy." Pushing Cigarettes
Overseas, supra note 52, at 20. A week before the meeting, the USTR in-
structed HHS to change the topic. Apart from the absence of representatives
from the Departments of State and Commerce, the meeting proceeded as sched-
uled. Id. at 21. This attempt to silence HHS demonstrates how far the Adminis-
tration is willing to go to avoid acknowledging the conflict between U.S. tobacco
export and health policies. Id
In another episode, shortly after Mason's emphatic outcry against tobacco
exports, see supra note 131, he was invited to testify at a congressional hearing
addressing the health effects of U.S. tobacco exports. Mintz, supra note 96, at
26. His attendance was cancelled just prior to the hearing, and HHS Secretary
Dr. Louis Sullivan later explained that the real issue in the debate over tobacco
exports was equitable treatment for U.S. products, not health policy considera-
tions. I& Because these statements conflict so drastically with prior HHS
speeches decrying U.S. tobacco export policy, this abrupt shift probably resulted
from pressure by the Administration to have HHS and the USTR present a
united front.
134. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. The Representatives requesting the
report were Henry Waxman (Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and Environ-
ment, Committee on Energy and Commerce), Pete Stark (Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Health, Committee on Ways and Means), Chet Atkins, Michael A.
Andrews, Jim Bates, Barbara Boxer, Richard Durbin, James Hansen, Mel Le-
vine, Mike Synar, Robert Torricelli, and Pete Visklosky.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 37.
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section 301 committee. 137 If Congress determines that health
considerations should predominate, however, it should make
HHS responsible for making export policy decisions regarding
tobacco products.' 3 Finally, if Congress believes that neither
trade nor health concerns alone should dictate tobacco export
policy, it should include an HHS representative on the section
301 committee. 3 9 Recent initiatives suggest that Congress will
choose the third option.
Members of the House of Representatives have introduced
the Cigarette Export Reform Act, which proposes that the inter-
agency section 301 decision-making process regarding tobacco
exports integrate both health and trade interests. 140 To this end,
the Act provides that an HHS representative sit on section 301
committees considering barriers to U.S. tobacco exports.141 In
addition to altering the composition of the 301 committee, the
Cigarette Export Reform Act would forbid the U.S. government
from seeking to change a foreign country's laws pertaining to
the sale, distribution, taxation, or advertisement of tobacco if
that country imposes the same conditions on all brands sold do-
mestically.142 The proposed legislation's restructuring of the
137. I& at 5.
138. I at 37.
139. Id
140. H.R. 2781, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
141. The Cigarette Export Reform Act provides:
The Section 301 Committee established by section 2002.3 of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on March 1, 1991, or any other
interagency committee established to assist the United States Trade
Representative in performing the functions vested in the Trade Repre-
sentative under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, shall include, with
respect to any case under such section 301 that involves cigarettes, lit-
tle cigars, snuff, chewing tobacco, or smokeless tobacco, representa-
tives of the Department of Health and Human Services in the Trade
Policy Staff Committee, the Trade Policy Review Group, and the Eco-
nomic Policy Council.
Id § 3. The Act assigns one member of HHS to each interagency committee
that considers section 301 actions involving cigarettes and chewing tobacco. 137
CONG. REC. E2381 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (extension of remarks of Rep. At-
kins).
The Cigarette Export Reform Act, introduced on June 26, 1991 by Mr. At-
kins, Mr. Waxman and others, was an attempt to "temper the Administration's
enthusiasm for cigarette exports." Id The bill was referred to the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means and to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Bill
Tracking Rep.: HR. 2781, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLTRCK File.
142. H.R. 2781, § 2. Section 2 of the Cigarette Export Reform Act provides:
No funds appropriated by law may be used by any officer, employee,
department, or agency of the United States to seek, through negotia-
tion or otherwise, the removal or reduction by any foreign country of
any restrictions which that country imposes or may impose on the ad-
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section 301 committee and greater deference to foreign law rep-
resents congressional desire to integrate health concerns into
the formulation of tobacco export policy.'
43
B. INTEGRATING HEALTH CONCERNS INTO TOBACCO EXPORT
POLICY FORMULATION
The Cigarette Export Reform Act's proposed inclusion of an
HHS official on the section 301 committee would address the
conflicts between U.S. policies by ensuring that the committee
considers health concerns while formulating tobacco export pol-
icy. Although HHS input may have little impact on trade policy
formulation, the potential for greater harmony between trade
and health policies provides a persuasive reason for HHS partici-
pation on the section 301 committee.
At first glance, it may appear that HHS membership in the
301 committee would have little effect on tobacco export policy.
The goals of HHS and trade officials seem irreconcilable. The
current representatives on the 301 committee favor promoting
tobacco exports because they represent agencies whose constitu-
ents benefit directly from increased exports.'" Trade and espe-
cially tobacco industry officials would prefer that U.S. tobacco
companies be allowed to sell unlimited quantities of tobacco
products abroad, without any restrictions on promotional tech-
vertising, manufacture, packaging, taxation, or sale or distribution of
cigarettes, little cigars, snuff, chewing tobacco, or smokeless tobacco,
that is produced in that foreign country.
Id.
143. The tobacco industry has said that it will lobby hard to defeat such leg-
islation. Greg Rushford, Butt Out Tobacco Lobby Challenged Over Markets in
Far East, LEGAL TImEs, Oct. 9, 1989, at 1, 22-23. This opposition, however, will
encounter a growing antismoking coalition in Congress, where it has become
"fairly safe, even trendy, to attack the tobacco industry." Myron Levin & Alan
C. Miller, For the Tobacco Industry, Ex-Smoker Waxman is the No. 1 Foe in
Congress, L.A. TIMEs, June 19, 1990, at D1.
Recent developments indicate that the U.S. tobacco industry may be willing
to incorporate health concerns into its export and regulate itself in order to
avoid broader government-imposed restrictions. Philip Morris has reportedly
volunteered to put warning labels on exported cigarette packages like those the
United States requires on packages of cigarettes sold domestically. Lourdes L.
Valeriano, Philip Morris Said to Agree to Change in Labeling Policy, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 6, 1992, at B2. The U.S. company plans initially to use warning labels in
English "until such time as dialogue with agencies of the local governments in
question results in warnings calling for different content and/or language."
R.J. Reynolds is also considering a similar measure. Id
144. For example, the Department of Labor represents U.S. laborers, who
benefit from increased exports. See text accompanying note 43, supra, for a list
of the current members of the 301 committee.
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niques.145 The 301 committee member from HHS, on the other
hand, would discourage increasing U.S. tobacco exports. An
HHS representative would probably favor a flat prohibition of
tobacco exports or at least restrictions on exports analogous to
the restrictions placed on tobacco products sold domestically. 146
However, some argue that the HHS representative's input would
be overpowered by the collective voices of trade officials less
concerned about health issues.
Nevertheless, HHS participation in the 301 committee pro-
cess would not be merely symbolic. Rather, it would contribute
to a tobacco export policy which reflects the competing goals of
trade and health representatives. U.S. trade representatives and
tobacco industry officials have incentives to incorporate HHS in-
put into trade policy. 147 An HHS representative could convince
trade officials that they should be content with obtaining a por-
tion of existing foreign tobacco markets for U.S. producers.
The HHS representative could advise trade and tobacco in-
dustry officials that efforts to change foreign tobacco regulations
would be as ineffective as they were in Thailand. When the U.S.
invoked section 301 to open the Thai tobacco market to its ex-
ports, in addition to seeking access to a portion of Thailand's ex-
isting tobacco market, USTR and tobacco industry officials
lobbied the Thai government to eliminate its restrictions on ciga-
rette promotion. 14s These efforts to manipulate foreign regula-
tions met strong opposition from well-organized international
health advocates 149 and were unsuccessful in pressuring Thai-
land to loosen its advertising ban.' 50 The United States's efforts
to attack Thailand's advertising regulations as GATT violations
145. While conducting negotiations with Asian countries pursuant to section
301 actions, the USTR has also bargained for advertising and promotional rights
for U.S. exporters. See supra notes 65-96 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions
on cigarettes sold in the United States).
147. Tobacco industry representatives are aware that they are "in an embat-
tled industry where [they do not] even want to blink or someone will cry foul."
Levin, supra note 127, at 14. By limiting their goals to obtaining part of existing
tobacco markets, industry representatives will respond to the criticism that
they are fighting for the right to direct American tobacco producers' sophisti-
cated marketing techniques at women and children abroad. See supra note 129.
148. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Seth Shulman, Global Smoke Out, TECH. REV., May/June 1991,
at 20. An international computer network called Globalink helped generate a
flood of letters that "served to remind the United States that the international
tobacco-control community is united." Id. (quoting John Bloom of the Advo-
cacy Institute, a smoking-control research center in Washington, D.C.).
150. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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were equally ineffective. 151 Instead, the GATT panel decision
marked the first instance that a major international trade body
had promoted tobacco control. 152
The worldwide antismoking coalition that resisted U.S. ef-
forts in the Thailand 301 dispute will most likely mobilize again
to defeat similar endeavors, and will use the Thai cigarette
GATT panel report as ammunition. Furthermore, many foreign
governments have begun to display their hostility toward pro-
motion of tobacco products, adopting more rigid advertising con-
trols.153  This trend toward more restrictive advertising
regulations will probably intensify in Asian countries as those
governments learn more about the health care costs that smok-
ing creates. 154 Indeed, as health advocates herald the exporta-
tion of the U.S. antismoking movement to Asia "years before its
time," this is a likely development. 1' By focusing trade officials'
attention on these obstacles, the HHS representative could con-
vince the 301 committee to limit its actions to ensuring that U.S.
tobacco companies compete on a level playing field for a propor-
tion of foreign tobacco markets, rather than trying to expand
these markets at the expense of human health.
Passage of the Cigarette Export Reform Act in its current
form would actually require trade officials to consider HHS's
recommendations. The Act prohibits the U.S. government from
attempting to change other countries' laws restricting tobacco
promotion.156 The section 301 committee oversees negotiations
between the USTR and foreign governments regarding section
301 violations, and must approve any resulting agreements
before the USTR terminates the 301 action.157 The Cigarette
Export Reform Act would force the 301 committee to ensure
that these agreements do not liberalize other countries' nondis-
criminatory restrictions on tobacco promotion. The HHS repre-
sentative would prevent the committee from ignoring this
statutory prohibition. Consequently, the addition of an HHS
151. Panel Report on Thai Restrictions, supra note 89, 78. The GATT
panel report condoned continuation of the advertising ban under the health ex-
ceptions to GATT requirements.
152. Shulman, supra note 149, at 20.
153. See Governments Move to Put Damper on Tobacco Ads, ADVERTISING
AGE, Aug. 5, 1991, at 9.
154. Canada has recently decided that its health care system cannot afford
the costs of tobacco-related diseases, and has enacted extraordinarily tough laws
to discourage smoking. See Shulman, supra note 149, at 21.
155. Rushford, supra note 143, at 1.
156. H.R. 2781, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
157. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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representative to the section 301 committee would allow the U.S.
tobacco industry to expand its market share abroad, rather than
the market itself. The result would be a more harmonious ex-
pression of the conflict between antismoking and free trade
policies.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. government must address the dichotomy between
its trade and health policies relating to tobacco. While using its
trade laws to remove foreign restrictions on the sale of U.S. to-
bacco, the United States discourages both domestic and interna-
tional tobacco use because of the accompanying health hazards.
These conflicting policies subject the United States to criticism
and inhibit the success of both efforts.
Congress should pass the proposed Cigarette Export Re-
form Act as an appropriate means to reconcile these competing
interests. The Act's proposed addition of an HHS representative
to the section 301 committee would successfully incorporate
both trade and health concerns into the process of formulating
tobacco export policy without permitting health policy to tran-
scend trade considerations. The HHS representative would en-
sure that trade officials' attempts to eliminate trade barriers
preventing U.S. tobacco producers from obtaining a portion of
foreign markets do not induce foreign governments to ease their
restrictions on tobacco promotion.
Unifying U.S. tobacco export policy may lead to resolving a
broader problem. In addition to its tobacco export policy, the
United States has been criticized for allowing U.S. companies to
sell certain dangerous pesticides and medications abroad while
prohibiting their domestic sale.1m Addressing the conflict re-
garding tobacco exports would be an initial step in defining the
United States' responsibility for controlling the exportation of
hazardous products.
158. See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, US. Export Policy: Profit Over Princi-
pie, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 1991, at H10.
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